Research
Published and Accepted Papers
Artificial Intelligence in the Knowledge Economy
with Eduard Talamàs
Accepted at the Journal of Political Economy
[ Abstract ][ Published Version ][ PDF ][ Online Appendix ][ arXiv Link ]Artificial Intelligence (AI) can transform the knowledge economy by automating non-codifiable work. To analyze this transformation, we incorporate AI into an economy where humans form hierarchical organizations: Less knowledgeable individuals become “workers” doing routine work, while others become “solvers” handling exceptions. We model AI as a technology that converts computational resources into “AI agents” that operate autonomously (as co-workers and solvers/co-pilots) or non-autonomously (solely as co-pilots). Autonomous AI primarily benefits the most knowledgeable individuals; non-autonomous AI benefits the least knowledgeable. However, output is higher with autonomous AI. These findings reconcile contradictory empirical evidence and reveal tradeoffs when regulating AI autonomy.
[ Macro Roundup ] The Impact of AI on Global Knowledge Work
with Eduard Talamàs
Accepted at the Journal of Monetary Economics (May 2025 CRN Conference)
We analyze how Artificial Intelligence (AI) reshapes global knowledge work in a two-region world where firms organize production hierarchically to use knowledge efficiently: the most knowledgeable individuals specialize in problem-solving, while others perform routine work. Before AI, the Advanced Economy specializes in problem-solving services, whereas the Emerging Economy focuses on routine work. AI converts compute—which is located in the Advanced Economy—into autonomous “AI agents'' that perfectly substitute for humans with a given level of knowledge. Basic AI reduces the Advanced Economy’s net exports of problem-solving services, potentially reversing pre-AI trade patterns. In contrast, sophisticated AI expands these exports, reinforcing existing trade patterns. Finally, we show that a global ban on AI autonomy redistributes AI’s gains toward lower-skilled workers, while a regional ban—such as prohibiting autonomy only in the Emerging Economy—offers little benefit to lower-skilled workers and harms the most knowledgeable individuals in that region.
Revisiting the Impact of Upstream Mergers with Downstream Complements and Substitutes
Accepted at the Economic Journal
I examine how upstream mergers affect negotiated prices when suppliers bargain with a monopoly intermediary selling products to final consumers. Conventional wisdom holds that such transactions lower negotiated prices when the products are complements for consumers and raise them when they are substitutes. The idea is that consumer demand relationships carry over to upstream negotiations, where mergers between complements weaken the suppliers’ bargaining leverage, while mergers between substitutes strengthen it. I challenge this view, showing that it breaks down when the intermediary sells products beyond those of the merging suppliers. In such cases, the merging suppliers' products may act as substitutes for the intermediary even if they are complements for consumers, or as complements for the intermediary even if they are substitutes for consumers. These findings show that upstream conglomerate mergers can raise prices without foreclosure or monopolization and help explain buyer-specific price effects resulting from such mergers.
Dual Moral Hazard and the Tyranny of Success
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Vol. 16, No. 4, November 2024, pp. 154-191
I explain why current success can undermine an organization's ability to innovate. I consider a standard bandit problem between a safe and a risky arm with two modifications. First, a principal allocates resources. Second, an agent must install the risky arm, which is not contractible. If the principal cannot commit to a resource policy, a dual moral hazard problem emerges: The agent's pay must be tied to the risky arm's success to encourage installation, inducing the principal to stop experimenting with the arm prematurely. This problem intensifies as the safe arm becomes more profitable, potentially leaving the organization worse off.
Monopolization with Must-Haves
with Juan-Pablo Montero
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Vol. 16, No. 3, August 2024, pp. 284-320
An increasing number of monopolization cases have been constructed around the notion of “must-have” items: products that distributors must carry to “compete effectively.” Motivated by these cases, we consider a multiproduct setting where upstream suppliers sell their products through competing distributors offering one stop-shopping convenience to consumers. We show the emergence of products that distributors cannot afford not to carry if their rivals do. A supplier of such products can exploit this must-have property, along with tying and exclusivity provisions, to monopolize adjacent, otherwise competitive markets. Policy interventions that ban tying or exclusivity provisions may prove ineffective or even backfire.
Discounts as a Barrier to Entry
with Juan-Pablo Montero and Nicolás Figueroa
American Economic Review, Vol. 106, No. 7, July 2016, pp. 1849-1877
To what extent can an incumbent manufacturer use discount contracts to foreclose efficient entry? We show that off-list-price rebates that do not commit buyers to unconditional transfers--like the rebates in EU Commission v. Michelin II, for instance--cannot be anticompetitive. This is true even in the presence of cost uncertainty, scale economies, or intense downstream competition, all three market settings where exclusion has been shown to emerge with exclusive dealing contracts. The difference stems from the fact that, unlike exclusive dealing provisions, rebates do not contractually commit retailers to exclusivity when signing the contract.
Working Papers
Automation, AI, and the Intergenerational Transmission of Knowledge
Updated: December 2025.
Recent advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI) have sparked expectations of unprecedented economic growth. Yet, by enabling senior workers to accomplish more tasks independently, AI may reduce entry-level opportunities, raising concerns about how future generations will acquire expertise. This paper develops a model to examine how automation and AI affect the intergenerational transmission of tacit knowledge—practical, hard-to-codify skills critical to workplace success. I show that the competitive equilibrium features socially excessive automation of early-career tasks, and that improvements in such automation generate an intergenerational trade-off: they raise short-run productivity but weaken the skills of future generations, slowing long-run growth—sometimes enough to reduce welfare. Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that AI-driven entry-level automation could reduce the long-run annual growth rate of U.S. per-capita output by 0.05 to 0.35 percentage points, depending on its scale. I further show that AI co-pilots can partially offset lost learning by assisting individuals who fail to acquire skills early in their careers. However, they may also weaken juniors’ incentives to develop such skills. These findings highlight the importance of preserving and expanding early-career learning opportunities to fully realize AI’s potential.
Upcoming Presentations: Kellogg Strategy (Jan. 28)
Video Presentation at the Luohan AcademyThe Turing Valley: How AI Capabilities Shape Labor Income
with Eduard Talamàs. Updated: August 2024
Do improvements in Artificial Intelligence (AI) benefit workers? We study how AI capabilities influence labor income in a competitive economy where production requires multidimensional knowledge, and firms organize production by matching humans and AI-powered machines in hierarchies designed to use knowledge efficiently. We show that advancements in AI in dimensions where machines underperform humans decrease total labor income, while advancements in dimensions where machines outperform humans increase it. Hence, if AI initially underperforms humans in all dimensions and improves gradually, total labor income initially declines before rising. We also characterize the AI that maximizes labor income. When humans are sufficiently weak in all knowledge dimensions, labor income is maximized when AI is as good as possible in all dimensions. Otherwise, labor income is maximized when AI simultaneously performs as poorly as possible in the dimensions where humans are relatively strong and as well as possible in the dimensions where humans are relatively weak. Our results suggest that choosing the direction of AI development can create significant divisions between the interests of labor and capital.