Discounts as a Barrier to Entry

with Juan-Pablo Montero and Nicolás Figueroa
American Economic Review, Vol. 106, No. 7, July 2016, pp. 1849-1877

To what extent can an incumbent manufacturer use discount contracts to foreclose efficient entry? We show that off-list-price rebates that do not commit buyers to unconditional transfers--like the rebates in EU Commission v. Michelin II, for instance--cannot be anticompetitive. This is true even in the presence of cost uncertainty, scale economies, or intense downstream competition, all three market settings where exclusion has been shown to emerge with exclusive dealing contracts. The difference stems from the fact that, unlike exclusive dealing provisions, rebates do not contractually commit retailers to exclusivity when signing the contract.

Monopolization with Must-Haves (Conditionally Accepted - AEJ:Micro)

with Juan-Pablo Montero
Last update:  August 2023

An increasing number of monopolization cases have been constructed around the notion of "must-have" items: products that distributors must carry to "compete effectively." Motivated by these cases, we consider a multiproduct setting where upstream suppliers sell their products through competing distributors offering one-stop-shopping convenience to consumers. We show the emergence of products that distributors cannot afford not to carry if their rivals do. A supplier of such products can exploit this must-have property, along with tying and exclusivity provisions, to monopolize adjacent, otherwise competitive markets. Policy interventions that ban tying or exclusivity provisions may prove ineffective or may even backfire.

Dual Moral Hazard and the Tyranny of Success (R&R AEJ:Micro)

Last update:  August 2023

I explain why current success can undermine an organization's ability to innovate. I consider a standard bandit problem between a safe and a risky arm with two modifications. First, a principal allocates resources. Second, an agent must install the risky arm, which is not contractible. If the principal cannot commit to a resource policy, a dual moral hazard problem emerges: The agent's pay must be tied to the risky arm's success to encourage installation, inducing the principal to stop experimenting with the arm prematurely. This problem intensifies as the safe arm becomes more profitable, potentially leaving the organization worse off.

Cross-Market Mergers with Common Customers:
When (and Why) Do They Increase Negotiated Prices?

Last update:  June 2023

I examine the implications of cross-market mergers of suppliers to intermediaries that bundle products for consumers. These mergers are controversial. Some argue that suppliers’ products will be substitutes for intermediaries, despite not being substitutes for consumers. Others contend that because bundling makes products complements for consumers, products must be complements for intermediaries. I contribute to this debate by showing that two products can be complements for consumers but substitutes for intermediaries when the products serve a similar role in attracting consumers to purchase the bundle. This result leads to new recommendations and helps explain why cross-market hospital mergers raise prices.